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RADITIONALLY, allegories have provided simple settings in
which complex concepts could be illuminated. Assume a more
primitive society that valued man-made shelter very highly. If a
shortage of housing was perceived to have resulted from a breakdown in
the market for bricks, the primary component of such shelters, a scheme to
protect the brick market would be a rational response.' An effective
scheme would protect both suppliers2 and users3 of the bricks if the devel-
oped economic system relied upon their sharing the income from the
finished shelters. A definition of bricks would be essential to such a regu-
latory scheme. The recognition that bricks can be produced in many
shapes and sizes and can be manufactured from different materials without
losing their functional characteristics mandates a definition broad enough
to encompass even unanticipated varieties.4 If the decisionmakers deter-
mined that transactions in finished shelters did not create the same risks
for society as transactions in bricks, the interpreters of the regulatory
scheme would have to decide whether to differentiate the transactions
based on the risk to society. One alternative would be to recognize the
difference in the risk of shelter transactions and exempt them from the
regulatory scheme.5 If the scheme developers had not recognized this dif-
ference in risk, however, and the exemption provided did not allow such
an interpretation, the interpreters could, in an artificial manner, turn to the
definition of bricks and find that the individual bricks, once integrated into
the structure of a shelter, were no longer bricks.
The metaphor of bricks as increments of capital is not perfect, but its
* B.S., Northwestern University; J.D., DePaul University; LL.M., University of Chi-
cago. Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
1. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976) (recognizing that trans-
actions in securities "are affected with a national public interest" necessitating regulation).
2. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Se-
curities Act of 1933 is applicable only to the sale or issuance of a security. Id
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies to transac-
tions involving either sales or purchases of a security. Id
4. See id §§ 77b, 78c (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (definitions and application of terms used
in the Acts).
5. See id § 77c (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (excepting certain classes of securities from
provisions of Act and granting Securites and Exchange Commission rulemaking power to
add any class of security to those securities exempted).
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tangible characteristics provide insight into the artificiality of the analyti-
cal model called the "sale of a business" doctrine. 6 The question of
whether the purchase or sale of all or substantially all interest in a business
entity creates less risk than the purchase or sale of a lesser interest, is an
open question beyond the scope of this Article. This Article examines the
sale of a business doctrine, which states that the transfer of a business ac-
complished by means of the transfer of its stock does not result in the
purchase or sale of a security. Thus, none of the regulations of the Federal
Securities Acts would apply to the transaction. To date, six federal appel-
late courts have considered this question. Three courts of appeals have
adopted the doctrine7 and three have denied it.8 Numerous district courts
in other circuits have also faced the issue.9
Analysis of the sale of a business doctrine begins with the eight United
States Supreme Court cases that have interpreted the statutory definitions
of a security.' 0 Those cases are sufficiently ambiguous to support either of
the circuit courts' positions, as a closer look at five of the appellate court
cases will demonstrate. Finally, this Article considers some of the unfore-
seen implications of the adoption of the sale of a business doctrine.
I. A SECURITY DEFINED: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court since 1943 has granted petitions for certiorari in
eight cases involving the issue of whether the particular interest at stake
qualified as a security." Of the nine interests involved, five were found to
6. See Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security.- The "Sale of Business" Doctrine Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1982).
7. King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344 (1Ilth Cir. 1982); Canfield v.Rapp & Sons, Inc.,
654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,966, at 96,054 (10th Cir. Apr. 19, 1977).
8. Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1983); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d
1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982); Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
9. See, e.g., Sprague v. Touche Ross & Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,354 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 1981) (First Circuit); Somogyi v. Butler, 518 F. Supp.
970 (D.N.J. 1981) (Third Circuit); Ducker v. Turner, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 97,386 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 1979) (Fifth Circuit).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l), 78c(a)(10) (1976).
11. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (certificate of deposit in federally in-
sured bank and agreement granting use of real property, fixed monthly payment, and share
in business profits); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (interest
in noncontributory compulsory pension plan); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837 (1975) (shares of stock in public nonprofit housing cooperative); Tcherepnin v.
Knigat, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (withdrawable interest in statutory state savings and loan asso-
ciation); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (contractual interest in
invested fund of money with annuity conversion right); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuity contracts with return to investors based
on pro rata interest in gains or losses in respondent's investment portfolio); SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (offering of fee simple interests in units of citrus grove
development); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (sale of sublease of
acreage of potential oil-producing land).
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be securities 12 and four were not.' 3 In each case decided between 1943
and 1967 the interest was found to be a security protected by the Federal
Securities Acts. 14 All four interests involved in cases decided between
1975 and 1982 were found not to be securities, and protection under fed-
eral law was denied.' 5 A consistent thread of reasoning runs through all
eight cases, however, so that a purely chronological policy-shift explana-
tion is inadequate. 16 Rather, the decisions must be examined in terms of
the statutory language involved and the policy rationales that underlie the
federal regulatory regime.
The statutory definitions of a security in the Securities Act' 7 and the
Securities Exchange Act 8 are virtually identical, and the Court has cited
12. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967) (withdrawable shares found to be
security); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 210 (1967) (fund interest consti-
tuted investment contract); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65, 66-
73 (1959) (variable annuity contracts found to be securities and not insurance or annuity
contracts); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294-99 (1946) (fee simple interest found to
be offering of investment contract); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351
(1946) (sale of sublease equivalent to sale of security).
13. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-60 (1982) (both certificate of deposit and
contractual rights found not to be securities); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551, 570 (1979) (interest in pension fund held not to be security); United Hous. Found.,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-58 (1975) (shares of stock in public nonprofit housing
cooperative held not to be security).
14. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 387 U.S. 202, 210 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 385 U.S. 65,
66-73 (1959); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294-99 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
15. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-60 (1982); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570 (1979); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 847-58 (1975).
16. The decisions of the Supreme Court in securities cases began their present conserva-
tive direction in 1975. The three security definition cases in this period were all consistent
with that conservative movement, although they retain a basic central consistency with their
five predecessors. Both SEC Y. W.J Howey Co. and SEC . CM. Joiner Leasing Corp.
provided the principles for that consistency. See infra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
The issue in the sale of a business doctrine case creates a more difficult problem for the
Court than the issue in the three cases in which certiorari was granted. The adoption of the
analysis mandated by the doctrine would be consistent with the general conservative direc-
tion of the Court and some of the dicta in earlier cases, but not with the narrow holding of
United Hous. Found, Inc. v. Forman. See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976) states:
When used in this subchapter unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certifi-
cate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1976) provides:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement
or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certifi-
1983]
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the cases interpreting them interchangeably.19 Each definition begins with
the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires"' 20 and proceeds to list a
series of instruments commonly recognized as securities. Three important
catchall categories extend the reach of the Acts to cover an interest in any
profit-sharing agreement, any investment contract, and any interest com-
monly regarded as a security. 2' The interests involved in the eight
Supreme Court cases can be viewed analytically in three categories. The
first group includes interests that answer to a nonsecurities name and have
a nonsecurities appearance. A second class includes interests that answer
to a nonsecurities name, but have some surface characteristics that resem-
ble securities. The third category embraces interests that have a securities
name and surface characteristics that resemble a security.
The Supreme Court has developed two similar but distinct tests for in-
terests in the first category. In SEC v. CM. Joiner Leasing Corp. 22 the
Securities and Exchange Commission sued to enjoin unregistered mail of-
fers of subleases on very small parcels of Texas oil land. Both the district
court and the circuit court found the interests to be oil and gas leases and
not securities.23 The language of the Securities Act specifically included
only fractional undivided interests in mineral rights;24 thus, the interest
could be a security only if it was covered by one of the catchall categories.
The Supreme Court held the interest to be an investment contract, 25 using
state blue sky law history as an analytical vehicle.26 The Supreme Court
also established the first federal test for an investment contract, which in-
quired into "[the] character the instrument is given in commerce by the
terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect."'27 Since the leases in Joiner had been widely
distributed by mail offers that included promises of exploratory wells
nearby, they were unlike pure real estate leases and their character in com-
merce resembled an interest in a development project. The test stated and
applied by the Court in Joiner could be characterized as a view through
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in gen-
eral, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not
include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is
likewise limited.
19. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c(a) (1976).
21. Id §§ 77b(i), 78c(a)(10).
22. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
23. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 133 F.2d 241, 246 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 320 U.S. 344
(1943).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976).
25. 320 U.S. at 352 n.10.
26. Id at 353. The Court stated that the offerings were not beyond the scope of federal
securities regulation even though the interest conveyed was an interest in real estate under
Texas law. 5d
27. Id at 352-53.
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the eyes of the promoter, dependent upon the distribution scheme devised
and the terms and inducements offered.
In SEC v. WJ Howey Co. 28 the Commission sought to enjoin the un-
registered offer and sale of small fee-simple interests in land evidenced by
a warranty deed and accompanied by an optional service contract to har-
vest and sell the citrus fruit growing on the land. The district court viewed
the transactions as ordinary real estate sales with an optional management
contract available. 29 The Supreme Court decision in Howey did not apply
the Joiner test,30 but rather established a new test that changed the empha-
sis from the commercial character of the instrument in commerce3' to the
now famous "economic reality" language. 32 While the character of the
instrument in commerce might be objectively judged by the totality of the
promoter's activities, the economic reality of the instrument is judged by
the more subjective economic influences on the investor. Those economic
influences that traditionally had defined an investment contract 33 became
the core of the new test. The Supreme Court held that "an investment
contract for purposes of the Securities Act, means a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party
.. .., As a matter of economic reality, the profitability of investments
in very small parcels of citrus grove land would depend upon the joint
harvesting and marketing efforts under the service contract provided by
the promoters.
In Joiner and Howey the Court, when required to analyze two interests
28. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
29. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 717-18 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293
(1946).
30. 328 U.S. at 299. It is not at all clear that the application of the Joiner test would
result in finding a security in the Howey set of facts. The Howey opinion states that the
consideration of economic risk-taking and profit-seeking underlies the Joiner decision. Id
at 299. Certain key elements, however, would have proven troublesome. First, the "charac-
ter the instrument is given in commerce" would look very much like a sale of real property
with a warranty deed. The distribution plan was unlike Joiner because most of the parcels
were sold to buyers who were physically present to view the orchard while visiting an adja-
cent resort. The offer's terms did not compel a conclusion that the transaction would not be
characterized as a sale of a real property interest in agricultural land. The economic incen-
tives offered the purchaser would be the only part of the test that could make the real prop-
erty interest look weak.
31. The Joiner decision seems weighted towards the distribution scheme and acts of the
promoters. Arguably there were additional underlying factors. The portion of the test de-
scribed as "economic inducements held out to the prospect" is vague. 320 U.S. at 353. In
the context of Joiner the small subleases were valueless without drilling and they were too
small to justify drilling by the sublessee. This was not necessarily true of the fee simple
interests in portions of the orchard in Howey. A stronger justification for the similarity in
underlying purpose of the two cases would be Joiner's reference to other decisions that raise
the dominant issue of Howey, the investor's reliance upon the efforts of others for his re-
ward. 320 U.S. at 352 n.10. Joiner ignores that factor unless this principle is subsumed in
the "economic inducement held out to the prospect."
32. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
33. The decision in Howey, like Joiner, turns to state blue sky law cases as a source for
defining an investment contract. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 n.4.
34. Id. at 299.
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that on the surface did not resemble securities, devised two tests to deter-
mine whether the interests could be classified as statutory securities in the
investment contract category. The Joiner test emphasized the appearance
of the interest in commerce as judged by the distributional scheme.35 The
Howey test emphasized the nature of the purchaser's expectations. 36 The
Court did not clearly indicate whether these were different tests, or if they
were, whether they were alternative tests, or whether the second super-
seded the first.
In the five cases following Joiner and Howey the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed interests facially resembling a security and placed a heavy emphasis
on the Howey test, with only one reference to the Joiner test.37 When the
Supreme Court again examined an interest bearing no facial resemblance
to a security, however, it utilized the Joiner test. In Marine Bank v.
Weaver 38 the plaintiff guaranteed a loan made by the defendant to a third
party. The transaction included a pledge of a certificate of deposit,
purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant bank, to collateralize the
loan, and an agreement between the plaintiff-guarantor and the third-party
debtor providing contractual benefits to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued to
void the guarantee, alleging it was part of a transaction that violated rule
lOb-5. 39 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
summary judgment for the defendant and concluded that a jury could
have found either the certificate of deposit or the agreement to be a secur-
ity.4° Since the agreement did not facially resemble a security, the Court's
analysis of it is considered at this point.41
The agreement provided the plaintiff with four promises as considera-
tion for his guarantee of the bank's loan to the promisor. The plaintiff was
to receive $100 per month, fifty percent of the net profits of the promisor's
company, the use of the promisor's barn and pasture, and the right to veto
future borrowing by the promisor. The circuit court applied the Howey
test and found an investment of money in a common enterprise with prof-
its to come solely from the efforts of others.42 The Supreme Court unani-
mously disagreed, not with the application of the test, but with the choice
of tests. In Joiner and Howey the interests, which did not resemble but
were found to be securities, were offered to a number of potential inves-
35. 320 U.S. at 352-53.
36. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
37. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570 (1979); United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-58 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 338 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 209-11 (1967) (reference
to Joiner test); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65, 66-73 (1959); see
also supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
38. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
40. Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 162-63, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S.
551 (1982).
41. The court's treatment of the certificate of deposit, which did bear a facial resem-
blance to a security, is discussed infra at notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
42. 637 F.2d at 162.
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tors43 and could have been traded publicly because they offered equivalent
value to many people." The unique privately tailored agreement involved
in Marine Bank failed the Joiner test, which is based on the commercial
character of the instrument, and thus was not a statutory security.45 The
number of potential investors and the lack of a distribution scheme, or at
least the inapplicability of one, are also important criteria. The tentative
conclusion emerging from Joiner, Howey, and Marine Bank holds that in-
terests that do not at least facially resemble securities should be examined
as to distributional scheme, objective commercial character,46 and subjec-
tive investment characteristics. 47 Evidently only those interests that meet
both tests would be classified as investment contracts and thereby as statu-
tory securities.
The second category of interests represented in the Court's analysis of
the statutory security definition differ from the first category by bearing
some facial resemblance to a security. The Court has analyzed such inter-
ests in three cases. 48 In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.
(VALIC) 49 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued to enjoin
the unregistered sale of a newly devised interest, a variable annuity, in-
tended to protect against inflationary risks. A traditional annuity is a con-
tract between the annuitant and an insurance company.50 The contract
requires the annuitant to pay the insurer a fixed amount of money in either
a lump sum or installments. Once he reaches the contractual age the an-
nuitant receives a fixed periodic benefit for the balance of the annuitant's
life. Thus the benefit to be received is a product of the expected yield on
the funds paid to the insurer and the actuarial life expectancy of the annui-
tant beyond the contractual age at which benefits begin. In an inflationary
economy annuities have become less desirable because the fixed benefits
are paid in funds whose purchasing power had declined. The variable an-
nuity was designed to protect the annuitant against inflation. During the
pay-in period the annuitant purchases annuity units whose value will fluc-
tuate with the value of the investment of those funds by the insurer. At the
end of the pay-in period, the amount of the future benefits is determined
based upon the value of the funds paid in as invested (instead of the
amount actually paid in) and the actuarial life expectancy of the annuitant.
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in VALIC fixed the incidence of
the risk-bearing feature of the contract as a decisive starting point for anal-
43. 455 U.S. at 559.
44. Id at 560.
45. Id, see Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352-53.
46. See Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352-53.
47. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
48. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); SEC v. United Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 385 U.S. 65
(1959).
49. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
50. See generally R. POZEN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 550-70 (1978).
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ysis.5 1 If the risk as to the amount of the ultimate benefits (other than the
actuarial risk) had been on the insurer, the opinion implies that the annu-
ity would not have been a security. 52 Since the annuitant bore the substan-
tial risk, however, that risk being the value of a pro rata share of the equity
interests in the portfolio, the interest was held to be a security. 53 The value
of the annuity ultimately depended on th value of an investment of money
by the annuitant in a common enterprise, with profits expected solely from
the efforts of others.54 Thus, the Supreme Court resolved the first case
involving an interest with a facial resemblance to a security by using the
Howey test to determine the investment contract character of the interest.
Justice Douglas's opinion in VALIC is cryptic due to the intermingling
of several issues in the case. The Court could have first determined
whether the interest was a security. If the answer were no, the case would
have been resolved. If the answer were yes, the issue of the security's ex-
emption from registration under Securities Act section 3(a)(8) 5 would
need to be resolved. The resolution of this issue would be totally separate
from the first issue and its analysis appropriately different. The Court
clouded its rationale by intermingling the two issues.
While Justice Douglas did respond to the dual issues of the existence of
a security and exemption from the regulatory scheme, Justice Brennan's
concurrence emphasized policy considerations. 56 Under the Securities Act
the emphasis is on disclosure of the details of the enterprise. 57 State insur-
ance acts emphasize the solvency and adequacy of the reserves of the in-
surance company.58 Because the obligation of the insurer under a variable
annuity is based primarily on the value of the investment of the paid-in
funds, traditional types of insurance regulation controlling the risk of in-
solvency are meaningless. Disclosure to the investor of the planned use of
funds and the character of the enterprise is clearly more valuable, but is
mandated only if the interest is deemed a statutory security. Justice Bren-
nan concluded that the choice of applicable laws depended on which regu-
latory scheme afforded adequate protection for the interest at stake.59 In
this case the federal securities law provided the greater protection.
The insurance industry reacted to the decision in VALIC by devising a
variation to the variable annuity called a flexible fund annuity. The flex-
51. See 359 U.S. at 71. Though strains of Justice Traynor's subsequent risk capital
theory are implied by the emphasis on where the risk lies, the total context of the opinion
uses this issue to identify a starting point rather than a basic analytical tool. See Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The
California Supreme Court held a membership in a country club to be a security because risk
capital was solicited in order to develop a profitable business. 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr.
at 188.
52. See 359 U.S. at 71-73.
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id. at 72 n. 13 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1976).
56. 359 U.S. at 80 (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 85.
58. Id.
59. d. at 85-86.
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ible fund annuity gave the annuitant the option of converting paid-in
funds to an annuity as with the variable annuity or converting the paid-in
funds to an annuity based upon a predetermined cash value. In theory,
this option placed the risk that concerned Justice Douglas in VALIC upon
the insurer, but still provided the annuitant the potential of an enhanced
value due to any appreciation in the fund. In SEC v. United Benefit Life
Insurance Co. 60 the SEC sought to enjoin the unregistered distribution of
these interests, arguing that they too were statutory securities. The
Supreme Court could have resolved the issue quite easily. The option of
receiving the predetermined cash value, called the flexible fund guarantee,
that would have placed substantial risk on the insurer, was illusory. The
guarantee amounted to less than the paid-in funds and thus caused the
annuitant to bear the greatest portion of the risk.6' This new scheme was
substantially indistinguishable from the VALIC scheme, and application
of the Howey test would have provided an adequate resolution. Justice
Harlan's majority opinion, however, chose instead to analyze the annuity's
investment contract characteristics by applying the Joiner test. The appli-
cation of this test changed the focus of the analysis to the commercial char-
acter of the instrument from the offeror's perspective. 62 The Court found
that such schemes "offer important competition to mutual funds. . . and
are pitched to the same consumer interest in growth through professionally
managed investment. ' 63 Thus, the manner in which the interest was
"pitched" or distributed could positively affect its character as a security.
Not until 1979 did the Court again analyze an interest having some fa-
cial resemblance to a traditional security. In International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel64 the plaintiff contended that his noncontributory (em-
ployer-contributed) interest in a pension fund was a security and alleged a
violation of rule lOb-5 65 caused by a lack of disclosure of material facts
concerning the vesting of the interest. Both the district court and the cir-
cuit court applied the Howey test to the interest. 66 The lower courts found
a common enterprise and profits derived from the management of the fund
by others, but had difficulty finding the required investment of money.
The Supreme Court resolved the difficulty by viewing the employer's con-
tribution to the fund as part of the total compensation package paid as
consideration for the plaintiffs labor.67 The employer's contribution was
functionally equivalent to payment of the employee and investment by the
employee of a portion of his compensation in the fund. The Court found,
however, that the plaintiff had sold his labor, not made an investment, and
thus lacked the requisite expectation of profits derived from the efforts of
60. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
61. Id at 208 n.10.
62. Id. at 211 (citing Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352-53).
63. 387 U.S. at 211.
64. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
66. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541, 550-52 (N.D. IUI. 1976),
aft'd, 561 F.2d 1223, 1233-37 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
67. 439 U.S. at 559-61.
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others. The Court held that the interest was not a security.68
Use of the Joiner test in addition to the Howey test would have made a
resolution of the issue consistent with that reached easier. Joiner's focus
on the character of the interest in commerce as determined by the means of
distribution or the way in which the interest was "pitched" would clearly
take it out of the security category. The interest in Daniel bore no resem-
blance to a security because it was distributed to every member of the
union irrespective of desire and was offered to the union as a whole rather
than to an individual recipient. Justice Powell's majority opinion bypassed
the Joiner test, however, and emphasized the importance of the Howey
test, as relied on in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 69 four years
previously. "In Forman ...we observed that the Howey test, which has
been used to determine the presence of an investment contract, embodies
the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defin-
ing a security." 70 The Court's approach in Daniel forced a questionably
narrow application of the Howey test 7' and substantially undercut the via-
bility of the Joiner test, at least with respect to interests that facially resem-
ble securities.
The Daniel Court also relied on the policy approach taken by Justice
Brennan in his VALIC concurrence to conclude that the pension fund in-
terest was not a security. The competing regulatory schemes involved in
Daniel were the disclosures mandated by the Securities Acts and the spe-
cific disclosure and regulation provisions for pension funds under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).72  The ERISA
disclosure73 and regulation74 provisions provide protection for persons
68. Id. at 560, 562.
69. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
70. 439 U.S. at 558. The Howey test focuses on the economic realities surrounding the
transaction. Justice Powell noted that the Court in Forman observed that this test "'run[s]
through all the Court's decisions defining a security.'" Id at 558 n. I1 (quoting Forman, 421
U.S. at 852).
71. See 439 U.S. at 558-62. Instead of recognizing the voluntary aspect of an invest-
ment decision, the opinion artificially suggested that the important term in "investment of
money" is the word "money." Therefore, the absence of some tangible consideration be-
comes significant. Id at 560. The opinion immediately retreated from this position, how-
ever, noting that an investment contract may be found not only when the consideration is
cash, but also when the investment is in the form of goods or services. Id at 560 n.12. The
Court then looked at the economic realities of the services rendered as consideration for the
total compensation package to determine if an investment was made. Id. at 560. The Court
concluded that the "employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not mak-
ing an investment." Id Finally, the Court's application of the Howey requirement of the
expectation of profits from a common enterprise managed by someone other than the inves-
tor is even more questionable. The opinion suggested that because the greatest part of the
benefits come from the employer contributions to the plan, rather than from the earnings of
the trustee-managed fund, this requirement of Howey was absent. Id at 561-62. The artifi-
ciality of this reasoning calls into question whether the interest in a mutual fund is a security
and is inconsistent with the prior analysis that suggests that the employer's contribution is
insignificant.
72. 439 U.S. at 569-70; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (regulating employee benefit plans).
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1030 (1976) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1030 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)) (detailing disclosure and reporting requirements).
74. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)) (providing minimum vesting standards).
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such as the plaintiff and thus militate against finding the interest involved
to be a security.75
The third category of interests, which bear both a securities name and a
facial resemblance to a security, is represented in three cases.76 Tcherepnin
v. Knight 77 concerned an interest established by state statute in a state sav-
ings and loan association. The Court described the interests as "withdraw-
able capital shares."78 The name of the instrument was a hybrid, with
"share" sounding like a security and "withdrawable" like a savings ac-
count. Although the name given the interest is not conclusive, in Joiner
the Court noted that some interests "such as notes, bonds, and stocks, are
pretty much standardized and the name alone carries well-settled mean-
ing.",79 The interests involved in Tcherepnin, however, were not specifi-
cally included in the statutory definition of a security, to which by
implication deference would be paid.80
Justice Warren's opinion for the Court emphasized the fact that the in-
terests involved were created by state statutes.8 ' Instead of considering the
character of the instrument in commerce82 or the economic reality of the
interest,83 the Court focused on "the legal character imparted to those
shares by the statute."' 84 The important statutory characteristics noted in
the opinion were (1) voting rights apportioned by value, (2) dividends de-
clared by the board of directors out of profits rather than measured by a
fixed rate of return, (3) restrictions on voluntary withdrawals, and (4) lim-
ited negotiability.85 The next step in the Court's analysis injected consid-
erable ambiguity into the opinion. The Court did not immediately decide
whether these legal characteristics made the interests statutory securities.
Rather, the Court returned to the Howey test and found that the interests
had the essential attributes of an investment contract.86 The Court then
continued beyond the Howey test and held that the legal characteristics of
the interests also qualified them as "certificate[s] of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement," "stock," and "transferable shares," all of
which are specifically included in the statutory definition of a security.87
75. 439 U.S. at 569-70.
76. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
77. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
78. Id at 333.
79. 320 U.S. at 351.
80. See 389 U.S. at 338. The Joiner Court added that "[i]nstruments may be included
within any of these definitions, as matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or
description." 320 U.S. at 351.
81. Id at 336-39.
82. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352-53.
83. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
84. 389 U.S. at 336.
85. Id at 337.
86. Id. at 338.
87. Id at 339-40; 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
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The Court's ambivalence left unclear the appropriate mode of analysis for
interests bearing a strong facial resemblance to a security.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman88 provided the Court with
an opportunity to dispel the ambiguity in Tcherepnin. The plaintiffs had
purchased shares of common stock in a nonprofit corporation, created by
state statute, that entitled them to rent a low-cost apartment in a privately
owned state-subsidized housing project. The appellate court held the in-
terest a security upon two alternative grounds.8 9 First, the shares in the
housing project were denominated as stock, bringing them within the lit-
eral language of the Securities Acts. 90 Second, the court of appeals held
that the interest satisfied the Howey economic reality test and was thus an
investment contract.91
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the interest was not a security
under either analysis.92 The denomination of the interest as stock was not
decisive, according to the Court.93 The statute provides that "the term
'security' means any . . . stock,' ' 94 but these words are preceded by the
phrase "unless the context otherwise requires." 95 The language of the stat-
ute thus requires consideration of the circumstances surrounding the trans-
action even when the interest resembles a security so strongly that its name
tracks the statutory language. This holding substantially weakens the
Joiner/Tcherepnin dicta requiring deference to the name of the interest.96
As the Court began its consideration of the circumstances surrounding the
transaction, three models were available to it: Joiner's "character in com-
merce," 97 Howey's "economic reality,"98 and Tcherepnin's legal character-
istics.99 The Court decisively chose Howey as setting forth the proper
approach.10° Justice Powell's opinion stated that it is the economic reali-
ties underlying a transaction that are critical. 10' This statement is mislead-
ing because the Court applied the economic realities test to the interest
involved to determine if those realities were consistent with the name given
to the interest.' 02 Finding them inconsistent, the majority concluded that
88. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
89. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 837
(1975).
90. 500 F.2d at 1252.
91. Id at 1255.
92. 421 U.S. at 859-60.
93. Id at 848.
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (1976).
95. Id. §§ 77b, 78c(a).
96. See Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 339; Joiner, 320 U.S. at 351.
97. 320 U.S. at 352.
98. 328 U.S. at 298.
99. 389 U.S. at 339.
100. 421 U.S. at 849.
101. Id
102. d. at 851:
These shares have none of the characteristics "that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of a security" H.R. Rep. No. 85, [73d Cong.,
1st Sess.] 11 [(1933)]. Despite their name, they lack what the Court in Tcher-
epnin deemed the most common feature of stock: the right to receive "divi-
dends contingent upon an apportionment of profits." 389 U.S., at 339. Nor do
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merely labelling an interest "stock" does not place the interest within the
statutory definition. 10 3
The Court turned next to the alternative holding of the appellate court,
which had held the interest to be an investment contract. 1°4 The Court
again used the Howey test for an investment contract, but here the Court
considered the economic reality of the transaction .105 The Howey tripartite
test as restated by the Court describes the economic realities of an invest-
ment contract transaction as "'. . . an investment of money in a common
enterprise with the profits to come solely from the efforts of others.' "106
The Court found that the purchasers in Forman were interested in acquir-
ing low-cost housing rather than making a profitable investment. 0 7 The
interest thus was not an investment contract. 108
The Supreme Court most recently analyzed an interest that facially re-
sembled a security in Marine Bank v. Weaver..'1 9 The certificate of deposit
purchased and pledged in Marine Bank arguably resembled other long-
term debt obligations. A parallel to the Forman mode of analysis can be
found in the langauge of the opinion. Under the Securities Exchange Act,
the definition of a security most similar to a certificate of deposit was that
which covers any note having a maturity exceeding nine months."10 The
Forman approach then required an analysis of the economic reality of the
transaction or interest. In Marine Bank the certificate of deposit received a
fixed rate of return commensurate with the risk of the investment. The risk
of loss was virtually nonexistent because of the protection afforded by the
they possess the other characteristics traditionally associated with stock: they
are not negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated; they confer no
voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and they cannot
appreciate in value.
103. Id at 858. This raises two very significant issues for the analysis of the "sale of a
business" doctrine. First, if the business enterprise is transferred by means of the sale of its
stock, what happens to the Joiner/Tcherepnin deference? It continues to exist if the interest
involved is consistent with its name. Forman provided the economic reality test for the
consistency. The second issue is economic reality of what? If it is the economic reality of
the underlying transaction, as Justice Powell's opinion expressly stated, great difficulty is
encountered. If it is the economic reality of the interest itself, as in Justice Powell's applica-
tion, the interest will certainly be consistent with its name.
104. 500 F.2d at 1255. This step would not have been required if the economic reality of
the stock interest had been consistent with its name. It would have been a security regard-
less of whether or not it was an investment contract.
105. 421 U.S. at 851-56.
106. Id. at 852 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 301).
107. 421 U.S. at 860.
108. Justice Powell's broad dictum in Forman suggests an alternative policy argument
extending beyond the narrow issues before the Court, which provides support for the sale of
a business doctrine adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Canfield v. Rapp &
Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981). After reviewing the congressional policy underlying
the Securities Act, Justice Powell described the implementation of this policy, stating that
"[t]he task of [defining securities] has fallen ... ultimately to the federal courts to decide
which of the myriad financial transactions in our society come within the coverage of those
statutes." 421 U.S. at 848. This statement suggests that those transactions not covered by
the policy underlying the Acts are not securities.
109. 455 U.S. 551 (1982); see supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. I I Thus the true economic nature
of the instrument made it unlike its statutory counterpart and no further
analysis was required."12
A surface reading of these Supreme Court cases supports a narrow tech-
nical argument concerning the proper approach to definition of a statutory
security. If the instrument in question does not resemble a traditional se-
curity, Joiner requires examination of its commercial character and the
distributional scheme. 13 Howey requires analysis of the incentives that
motivated the investment decision. 14 Marine Bank appears to require sat-
isfaction of both tests."l 5 If the instrument in question bears a slight facial
resemblance to a traditional security, VALIC and Daniel indicate that the
Howey test is sufficient" 16 and that United Benefit Life's reliance upon the
Joiner test is unnecessary. 1 7 Finally, if the instrument in question bears a
strong facial resemblance to a traditional or statutorily defined security,
the Forman test is appropriate. The Forman approach examines the un-
derlying economic similarity between the interest and its statutory counter-
part."i8 The Howey test would be applied only when the instrument
allegedly fell into the catch-all investment contract category. 19
Beneath the surface of these technical decisions lie the dicta of VALIC,
Daniel, and Forman, which suggest a different approach to the definition
of a security. Justice Brennan's concurrence in VALIC and the Court's
opinion in Daniel imply that where an alternate regulatory scheme pro-
vides adequate investor protection, the need for similar protection under
federal securities laws is greatly diminished.120 The Forman opinion sug-
gests that the Howey tripartite test defines the category of investors Con-
gress intended to protect. 121 Viewed from this perspective, the Supreme
Court decisions carry quite different implications. Within this somewhat
ambiguous framework the courts of appeals have begun to develop models
for the analysis of the sale of a business accomplished by the sale of equity
interests.
111. 455 U.S. at 558-59.
112. Id.
113. See Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352.
114. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. The tripartite test is the investment of money, in a
common enterprise, with the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others. Id at
301.
115. See supra notes 38-45, 109-12 and accompanying text (discussion of both tests as
applied in Marine Bank).
116. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussion of VALIC and Ilowey
test); supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussion of Daniel and Howey test).
117. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
118. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 850-51.
119. See id at 851-53. Whenever the instrument no longer resembled a specific statutory
counterpart, it would move back one category and the appropriate test for that category
would be applied.
120. See supra notes 56-59, 72-75 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 108.
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II. AN EMERGING DOCTRINE: THE APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court decision in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. For-
man ' 22 was critical of the formation of the sale of a business doctrine be-
cause it established that an instrument bearing a securities name need not
automatically be considered a security. Thus, the important appellate
court decisions are those with post-Forman analyses. The issue of treat-
ment of the sale of a business under the securities laws first arose before
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Chandler v. Kew, Inc. 123 The sum-
mary fashion in which the issue was resolved indicated that its implica-
tions were not clear. The plaintiff in Chandler had acquired a liquor store
by purchasing 100% of the stock from its owners. The court of appeals
held the federal securities laws inapplicable.' 24 The court excerpted a quo-
tation from Forman stating that Congress intended the application of the
Securities Acts to turn on the economic realities underlying the transac-
tion.' 25 The Chandler court characterized the economic realities of the
case as the purchase of a liquor store and the incidental receipt of 100% of
the stock as evidence of ownership. ' 26 The court found "no security trans-
action within the purview of the federal statutes."'
27
The Chandler opinion is extremely ambiguous. Alternative explana-
tions may be given for the decision, but each creates analytical problems.
One reading of the opinion suggests that the transaction did not come
within the purview of the securities laws because the interest sold was not a
security. The Chandler court did not make such a statement. This inter-
pretation requires the conclusion that stock is not a security when it is only
an incidental indicia of ownership. Unfortunately, stock in a corporation
is never more than an indicia of ownership. A narrower reading of the
opinion implies that stock is an incidental indicia of ownership only when
100% of it is purchased. This reasoning would change the outcome in
every securities case resulting from a merger in which 100% of the stock of
a corporation was acquired. Finally, the opinion may be read literally,
with no implication as to the existence or nonexistence of a security.
28
The opinion itself provides no guidance for characterizing the interests in-
volved. Perhaps such an early decision should not be criticized for failing
to anticipate the implications of a new idea.
When a seemingly similar problem arose in the Seventh Circuit almost
four years later, the implications should have been clearer.' 29 In Frederik-
122. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
123. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966 (10th Cir. Apr. 19, 1977).




128. The court characterized the transaction as the purchase of a liquor store and stated
that it was not within the purview of the statute. Id
129. In the interim the Fc.urth Circuit, in Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979), had analyzed a distinguishable situation and
reached the opposite result. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
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sen v. Polo way 130 the court of appeals, however, dealt with a fact situation
inappropriate for an expanded analysis. In a complex transaction the
plaintiff, Emerald City Corporation (ECC), purchased the assets of the de-
fendant's corporation, North Shore Marina, Inc. (NSM).13' ECC
purchased the assets of NSM for cash at a gross value. Before NSM dis-
tributed the cash to its sole stockholder, ECC wanted assurance that all
debts of NSM had been paid. To gain this assurance, ECC needed to ac-
quire control of NSM, whose only asset was the cash in escrow paid for the
assets. ECC accomplished this goal by purchasing ten percent of the NSM
shares for ten dollars and placing the balance of the shares in a voting trust
controlled by ECC. Upon payment of all of NSM's debts the stock in the
voting trust was to be redeemed, and NSM collapsed. The transaction
thus essentially involved a purchase by the plaintiff of the physical assets
of another corporation for cash, rather than an acquisition of NSM or a
stock purchase. Subsequently, the plaintiff became dissatisfied with the
transaction and sued for damages resulting from fraud in connection with
this alleged security transaction. The case contained none of the difficult
issues presented by the sale of a business doctrine. 132 Instead of taking the
straightforward approach seemingly dictated by the facts of the transac-
tion, however, Judge Sprecher's opinion for the court assumed that the
plaintiff had acquired North Shore Marina. 133 The court thus analyzed
the definitional issue and ultimately concluded that the transaction was not
within the purview of the federal securities laws.' 34
Since the plaintiff had not acquired NSM or its stock, the issue discussed
in the opinion was not properly before the court. Nevertheless, Frederik-
sen indicates the analysis the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals would ap-
ply to a case involving the sale of a business. The court relied upon the
130. 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
131. Judge Sprecher's description of the transaction is self-contradictory. Early in the
opinion Judge Sprecher described the transaction by stating "Emerald City Corporation
('ECC') negotiated for, and then purchased, the assets and stock of North Shore Marina,
Inc. ('NSM')." 637 F.2d at 1148. If one purchased the assets of a corporation for cash, it
would be pointless to purchase the stock of the corporation's single shareholder for cash to
own thereby the right to the cash paid for the assets. The only purchase of shares by the
plaintiff was a nominal purchase for $10 as consideration for the defendant's placing his
shares in a voting trust to insure the payment of all debts before redemption. Id at 1149.
132. The only purchase of stock was the nominal purchase for $10 of an interest in
NSM's cash. Even if this was a purchase of stock, no fraud was connected with it and no
demonstration made that this transaction was the cause of any loss to the plaintiff. If the
plaintiff had argued that placing the balance of the defendant's NSM stock in a voting trust
controlled by the plaintiff, for the defendant's benefit, was the sale of a security, the same
problems would have been presented for the plaintiffs theory. Finally, if the plaintiff had
argued that the purchase of assets was a purchase of a security, the only theory available
would have been that of an investment contract. The use of the Howey tripartite test would
resolve this issue easily and without controversy. No security transaction would be found
because the criteria are (1) an investment of money or tangible property (2) with an expecta-
tion of profit (3) solely from the efforts of others, and in this case ECC assumed management
control.
133. 637 F.2d at 1149. Judge Sprecher stated that "[tihe critical legal issue in this case is
whether the plaintiffs' acquisition of North Shore Marina involves a 'security' . ... Id
134. Id at 1151-52.
[Vol. 37
SALE OF A BUSINESS DOCTRINE
general policy inherent in Forman rather than Forman's technical analysis
and recognized that the purpose underlying the Securities Act is protection
of capital market investors through a registration and disclosure
scheme.' 35 The court therefore concluded that one test of a security asks
whether the interest is being sold to raise capital.136 Application of this
test would mean that the secondary purchase or sale of any stock was not
the purchase or sale of a security. Such a result ignores the need for pro-
tection of organized or informal secondary markets, which are essential to
the maintenance of the primary market that raises initial capital. The
Frederiksen court also stated that the primary test for a security, according
to Forman, requires analysis of the underlying economic reality of the in-
terest being purchased or sold.' 37 The opinion characterized Forman as
contrasting investments with purchases in which the desire is to "'use or
consume the item purchased.' "138 Forman dealt with a consumer's
purchase of an interest that entitled him to live in a low-rent apartment.
The Frederiksen court used Forman's approach and suggested that the
plaintiff wished to use the assets of NSM commercially rather than invest
in them.' 39 Although this approach may be helpful in dealing with tempo-
rary interests such as leases or notes, it has little relevance to a purchase of
assets to be used permanently in a commercial venture. Finally, the court
equated Forman's economic reality analysis with Howey's tripartite test. 140
Although the economic reality of an investment contract can be measured
by this test, application of it to conventional securities produces unex-
pected results. Under the Howey test the entrepreneur who establishes a
corporation would not be investing his money. The shares of stock evi-
dencing his interest would not be securities. If the entrepreneur sold a
portion of his interest to a third person, he would not be selling a security,
but the buyer would be buying a security. If the entrepreneur sold a con-
trolling interest in his corporation, he might be selling a security, but the
buyer might not be purchasing a security. Howey's tripartite test was never
intended to be, nor is it capable of being the exclusive test for a security.
The Frederiksen decision left uncertain the position of the Seventh Cir-
cuit regarding the sale of a business doctrine. That circuit soon had an
opportunity to clarify its stance, however. Canfield v. Rapp & Sons, Inc. 141
involved a transaction structured without ambiguity. The plaintiffs had
purchased 100% of the stock in the Twigg Corporation from its three own-
ers. Judge Sprecher again wrote for the court, and applied an analysis that
135. Id at 1150.
136. Id. This idea seems to be generated by Judge Sprecher's attempt to distinguish the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1979),
which did not require such a distinction. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Coffin and its rejection of the sale of a business doctrine.
137. 637 F.2d at 1151.
138. Id at 1150 (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. at 853).
139. 637 F.2d at 1150.
140. Id at 1152.
141. 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981).
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placed Frederiksen in context. 142 The court of appeals combined three
separate concepts and developed a model of protection based on the defi-
nition of a security. The first concept used by the court provides that the
name given to an interest is not binding on the court. 143 The second con-
cept states that the economic realities underlying the transaction, not the
interest, indicate whether a security is involved.44 The third notion holds
that the Howey tripartite test defines economic reality. 145  This idea
stresses the third element of the Howey test, which requires profits to be
derived from the efforts of others. 46 Together these three concepts indi-
cate, according to the court, that the federal securities laws protect the in-
terests of those who invest their money in enterprises that they do not
control."47 A corollary to this result would hold that the federal securities
acts were not intended to protect an interest acquired by the expenditure of
money that represents control of the enterprise. Unfortunately, this For-
142. Id at 463, 465-66. Some of the language in Canfield could indicate that it was an
expansion of the concept established in Frederiksen, but Judge Sprecher probably would not
so characterize it. It is useful, however, to make a distinction between the two decisions
because Frederiksen, without its dictum, can be harmonized with other decisions not adopt-
ing the sale of a business doctrine, while Canfield cannot. Frederiksen involved the sale of
the physical assets of a corporation and the nominal sale of some stock for $I 0 to assure the
payment of the corporation's debts. The sale of stock was incident to the sale of something
else that was difficult to define as a security. The plaintiffs were not buying and the defend-
ant was not selling the stock (or securities) of North Shore Marina. The purchase and sale
were of the assets, or, as one might generally characterize it, the "entire business" of North
Shore Marina. Thus, when Judge Sprecher characterized Frederiksen as raising the "ques-
tion of whether alleged fraud regarding the sale of stock incident to sale of an entire business
falls within the scope of the federal securities laws," Canfield, 654 F.2d at 463 (emphasis
added), he accurately described the holding. In this case the "incident to" language is very
clear and would indicate that the principle of Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966 (10th Cir. Apr. 19, 1977), was consistent, even though the
application was unclear. When a transaction results, however, in only the purchase of the
shares of a corporation and enough are purchased, the result will always be the purchase of
the business. No criteria are established to indicate when such share purchases are inciden-
tal to the purchase of the business. Canfield is an expansion of Frederiksen because the
incidental to language appears to become irrelevant.
143. 654 F.2d at 463. This concept originated in cases in which the interest was de-
scribed as something unlike a security, but which actually had characteristics of a security.
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298; Joiner, 320 U.S. at 351. The concept was retained in cases
where the name was closer to a traditional security. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
338-39 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65, 69 (1959). In all
of these cases because the name differed from the list of statutory securities, the Howey
tripartite test was used to determine whether they were investment contracts. The concept as
it arose in Forman was different. There the interest was named with a statutory definitional
name. The test for this kind of an interest was not Howey's tripartite test, but rather whether
the interest had the characteristics of its name. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 847-48.
144. 654 F.2d at 463; see Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. This problem is engendered by the
ambiguous language of Justice Powell's opinion in Forman. In Canfield Judge Sprecher
hedged by addressing both concepts. In the text of the opinion he defined economic reality
of the transaction to mean the Howey tripartite test. 654 F.2d at 463. He suggested, how-
ever, that the economic realities of the interest are not those of stock when 100% control is
purchased. The fundamental characteristics of right to vote and right to receive dividends
are not meaningful tests when the purchaser is unlike an investor because he controls them.
Id. at 466 n.7.
145. 654 F.2d at 463.
146. Id.
147. See id at 463-64.
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man -based policy reasoning was used to answer the threshold question of
whether the interest was a security. Such an approach removed the inter-
est entirely from coverage by the federal securities laws. A different ap-
proach might have limited application of a particular protective device
such as registration under the Securities Act or antifraud coverage under
the Securities Exchange Act. These implications must be considered
before the analysis can be evaluated. 48
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied an analysis contrary to
that of Canfield in Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc. 49 The facts of Coffin
arguably did not represent an appropriate occasion for a discussion of the
sale of a business doctrine because the plaintiff had purchased only a one-
half interest in the corporation. The court's analysis, however, is clear.
The court applied Forman's technical analysis in a straightforward fash-
ion, and ignored the policy dicta in Forman relied upon by the Seventh
Circuit in Canfield.'50 The court recognized that the name given the inter-
est is not necessarily controlling. Rather, the issue is whether the interest
has the "'significant characteristics typically associated with the named
instrument.' "'5' According to the court, the substance of the transaction
need not be analyzed if the interest does not satisfy this test.'5 2 The court
concluded that the Howey test should be applied only when the interest
lacks the characteristics associated with its name and therefore is not easily
recognized as a security in the capital market.' 53 The Coffin court thus
clearly rejected the sale of a business doctrine.
In Golden v. Garafalo 154 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals provided a
direct counterargument to the Seventh Circuit's Canfield decision. The
plaintiffs in Golden had purchased 100% of the common stock of a corpo-
ration engaged in the ticket brokering service from its sole owner. The
new owners were to be the sole managers of the business. The court of
appeals squarely faced the security issue and rejected the sale of a business
doctrine. 5 5 The court first analyzed the relevant Supreme Court decisions
and concluded that they were not dispositive of the question; the court did,
however, find support in Forman for its refusal to adopt the sale of a busi-
ness doctrine.' 56 The court also found the Howey tripartite test inapplica-
ble because that test covers only unique interests that do not resemble
statutorily named securities.157
The Golden decision is valuable because it provides the first in-depth
judicial criticism of the sale of a new business doctrine. The court based
its criticism on the difficulty of applying the third element of the Howey
148. For a discussion of these implications, see infra part III.
149. 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
150. Id at 1204.
151. Id (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. at 850-51).
152. 596 F.2d at 1204.
153. Id
154. 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
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test, which requires profits to come from the efforts of others, to traditional
equity interests. 15 8 If the existence of an intent to manage is the dispositive
factor, intractable questions concerning passive investors forced into man-
agement roles and quasi-passive investors employed in limited capacities
by the enterprise will arise. If control is the key element, the wide range of
interests which may constitute control in any given business organization
will make the existence of that element extremely difficult for a trial court
to determine. Both approaches assume that a distinction can be made be-
tween commercial and investment interests. In the context of the purchase
of a business, however, both types of interest are always present, and an
attempt to suggest the primacy of one over the other would be artificial
and arbitrary. Such an attempt would rest the availability of protection
under the federal securities laws on "uncertain and slippery factors."' 5 9
Only one other circuit court of appeals has considered the sale of a busi-
ness doctrine. In King v. Winkler ' 60 the Eleventh Circuit approached the
issue from a slightly different direction. The plaintiffs in King had agreed
to purchase the defendant's business, which had been listed for sale with a
broker. After this agreement was made, attorneys were brought in to
structure the transaction. A rather complex sequence of events resulted.
The plaintiffs purchased all the stock of one corporation; thereafter, that
corporation purchased all the stock of a second corporation, leaving the
plaintiffs in full control of both corporations. The plaintiffs later filed suit
alleging violations of the Securities Acts. The court of appeals held that
the sequence of events was not a security transaction controlled by either
Act. 16 1 The court admitted that under the Forman analysis the stock inter-
est was a security, but nevertheless used the Howey test to determine
whether the case involved a transaction "intended to be governed by the
Federal Securities Acts."' 62
The court's approach lacks a statutory basis. The transactional exemp-
tions from registration in the Securities Act do not depend on the Howey
criteria. 163 The broad language of section 12(2) of the Securities Act cre-
ates liability without any transactional exemption. 164 Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act' 65 and rule lOb-5166 contain no transactional ex-
emptions and indeed contain broad language rebutting any such implica-
tion. The legislative history of the Acts, which indicates a goal of investor
protection, provides no evidence of an intent to create a broad transac-
158. Id at 1145. The court referred to the "inherent illusiveness" of the third part of the
Howey test. Id
159. Id In Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, relying on the pragmatic arguments presented in Golden, joined the Second and
Fourth Circuits in rejecting the sale of a business doctrine.
160. 673 F.2d 342 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
161. Id at 343.
162. Id at 344-45.
163. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
164. Id § 771(2) (1976).
165. Id § 78j(b) (1976).
166. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
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tional exemption for any transaction in a security. 167 Although the lan-
guage and the policy of the Eleventh Circuit are clearer than the
definitional analysis of the Seventh Circuit, the King theory cannot be
supported.
One general agreement emerges from the analysis of the six circuits that
have approached the sale of a business problem. Although the Supreme
Court has addressed the issue of defining a security in a number of differ-
ent contexts, the Court has not made a definitive statement that indicates
proper treatment of the sale of a business. The Forman analysis supports
security treatment because the stock sold has all the characteristics of an
interest so named and listed in the statute. On the other hand, a persuasive
argument can be made that the protection of the Acts was not intended to
and should not extend to such a transaction. 68 The ultimate issue must be
whether judicial use of a limiting definition of a security is an appropriate
means to limit the protection of the Acts.
III. THE UNFORESEEN IMPLICATIONS OF THE SALE OF
A BUSINESS DOCTRINE
A. The Securities Act of 1933
The basic regulatory scheme of the Securities Act 169 provides that the
registration process, which is intended to supply potential investors with
the information necessary to an investment decision, must precede the of-
fer and sale of all securities.' 70 Certain narrow categories of securities and
transactions are exempted from this registration process.' 7 ' These exemp-
tions reflect the judgment of Congress that investors in certain limited situ-
ations do not need the protections of the registration process.' 72 The Act
contains no indication, however, that Congress has determined that an in-
167. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
168. The majority in Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982), provided the
strongest rationale for the sale of a business doctrine, but still found it unpersuasive. Id at
1140. Judge Winter recognized that permitting all stock that has the basic characteristics of
stock to be included within the statutory definition of a security results in an overbroad
application of the Acts. Id at 1146. Congress was clearly concerned with protecting market
investors who had limited opportunity to obtain the necessary information upon which to
base an investment decision. The courts have extended this protection to nonorganized mar-
kets and even face-to-face transactions. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The
need for such protection is less clear in these situations because first, the buyer has the op-
portunity to demand the information and, second, because other protective remedies are
available in these nonintermediary transactions. The overbreadth is greatest in the sale of a
business transaction because the parties are principals and have the leverage to gain infor-
mation and the sophistication to use it, often unavailable to more passive investors.
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
170. Id § 77e (1976). This mandate is enforceable by three distinctly different remedies:
private civil liability, id §§ 77k-77/; public civil equitable remedies, id. § 77t(b); and public
criminal action, id §§ 77t(b), 77x.
171. See id § 77c(a)(1)-(8) (exempt securities); id §§ 77c(a)(9)-(11), 77c(b), 77d (transac-
tions exempt from process).




vestor who purchases control of a business entity does not need the protec-
tion of the disclosure process.173 An argument that a broad exemption for
purchases of control would implement congressional intent could, how-
ever, be based on the exemption found in section 4(2) for "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering." 74 According to the Supreme
Court, Congress created section 4(2) because it believed that wealthy, so-
phisticated investors can compel disclosure of necessary investment infor-
mation and do not need the protection of formal disclosure
requirements. 75 Three limitations, however, restrict the availability of
section 4(2). The offeree must be either wealthy or knowledgeable, the
seller must also be the issuer, and resales of the securities are limited by the
provisions of section 4(1).176 A judicial determination that a security was
not involved whenever an investor purchased a controlling equity interest
would create an exemption not limited to issuers or qualified offerees. The
applicability of the disclosure requirements to resale would depend upon
the presence or absence of a shift in control.
An example helps to demonstrate the artificiality inherent in use of the
definition of a security to create a broad exemption. Assume the merger of
corporation A and corporation B. Corporation A is large and closely held
and corporation B is large and publicly held. If the assets of B are sold to
A for stock in A, and B remains a holding company with control of A,
should this transaction be exempt from a prospectus requirement? Does
the transaction change materially if the shares of A are not held by B but
are distributed to the shareholders of B who individually do not control
A? If the transaction is structured as a merger, with shareholders of corpo-
ration A holding the controlling interest in the merged corporations, is the
need for prospectus information different? If shareholder X, the majority
shareholder of A, receives the controlling interest in the merged corpora-
tions, does the need for prospectus information change? Under the sale of
a business doctrine, no security is involved in these transactions. Any sub-
sequent distribution of shares by the holding company corporations, how-
ever, would trigger prospectus requirements as to some of the distributees,
because some of the shares would not carry a control feature and thus
would be securities. This disclosure would come at a time when no invest-
ment decision was made and would thus be useless. Finally, government
regulation of disclosure upon resale would become extremely difficult
under the sale of a business doctrine because the shares' status as a security
would always depend on the percentage of stock purchased by the buyer.
173. The adoption of the sale of a business doctrine would substitute a judicially created
exemption for all such transactions irrespective of any analysis of the investor's need for
information. The combination of the potential overbreadth of such an exemption and the
extra-legislative manner of its creation result in preliminary doubts as to its propriety.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
175. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126-27 (1953).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1976). Resales of securities acquired by control persons who
receive them in a transaction exempt under § 4(2) are limited by § 4(1) because that section
may cause them to be treated as underwriters. Id
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The likelihood of section 12(1) liability, 177 SEC suits for injunctions under
section 20,178 and potential criminal actions under section 20179 would be
uncertain, and the viability of the prospectus disclosure scheme would be
severely undermined.
The contention that Congress intended to exempt the sale of a business
from the federal disclosure scheme could also be based upon the transac-
tional exemption found in section 3(a)( 11) for purely intrastate transac-
tions.'80 The limited size of most local corporations and the restrictions on
resale of stock support the assertion that transactions in the stock of such
corporations by local residents do not need the protection of the disclosure
scheme. The intrastate exemption can be viewed in actuality as a close
corporation exemption controlled by geographical limits rather than a
quasi-federal exemption based upon the adequacy of state control. The
statutory language, however, does not support such a rationale. The sale
of a business doctrine, which lacks close corporation limitations and con-
tains only questionable resale restrictions, would expand the transactional
intrastate exemption beyond recognition.
A final provision of the Securities Act supports rejection of the sale of a
business doctrine. Section 12(2)181 creates liability for misrepresentations
and material omissions by a seller even when the disclosure scheme of
section 5 does not apply.' 8 2 Congress evidently felt the need for disclosure
protection in the secondary market and intended section 12(2) to extend
such protection to transactions outside the organized markets.' 8 3 The in-
adequacies of state tort-misrepresentation theories justify such an ap-
proach. The scheme of disclosure in section 12(2) extends to all the
securities and transactions exempted by section 3, other than governmental
securities. 1 4 This extension of liability seems to conflict with judicial ex-
clusion of offers and sales of controlling business interests from Securities
Act coverage on the grounds that securities are not involved. Although
one could argue that a purchaser of control of a business entity has suffi-
cient leverage to compel adequate disclosure in the absence of section
12(2) protection, there is no indication that Congress shared such a belief.
As demonstrated above, the sale of a business doctrine raises difficult
problems under the Securities Act that the courts have not yet considered.
First, a broad definitional exemption would, in effect, restructure the regis-
tration and disclosure scheme in the primary market, especially in business
combination cases. The concept of resales of restricted securities would be
further complicated by the artificial recategorization of common stock in-
177. Id § 771(1).
178. Id § 77t.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 77c(a)(1 1).
181. Id § 771(2).
182. Id § 77e.
183. Id § 771(2). The short statute of limitations contained in § 13 and the privity re-
quirement inherent in § 12(2) limit to some degree the federal cause of action. Id §§ 77e,
771(2).
184. Id § 771(2).
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terests as securities or nonsecurities that would occur with each change in
the size of the purchaser's interest. Second, the broad exemption scheme
created by the sale of a business doctrine would confound SEC prophylac-
tic remedies and create unmanageable uncertainty in the area of criminal
penalties. Finally, the rationale behind the alternate disclosure scheme of
section 12(2) is inconsistent with creation of an extrastatutory exemption
for sales of controlling business interests.
B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The implications of a definitional exemption create more extensive
problems under the substantially more complex Securities Exchange
Act.' 85 The language of the Act can be read, on the surface at least, as
lending more support to a limit on investor protection than can the terms
of the Securities Act. Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act states that
the national public interest in investor protection extends to "transactions
in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-
the-counter markets."' 8 6 The regulatory scheme of the Act is designed to
further that public interest by removing impediments to and protecting the
integrity of a national securities marketplace. 87
An argument can thus be made in faror of limiting application of the
regulatory scheme of the Securities Exchange Act to transactions in public
markets or to interests of investors that are affected by transactions in such
markets. Supporters of the argument must recognize, however, that since
this Act does not exempt transactions from the regulatory scheme, the judi-
ciary must implement congressional intent by limiting the definition of a
security. The Supreme Court cases defining securities complicate this ar-
gument. The Court's inclusion of unconventional interests not sold in na-
tional marketplaces within the definition of a security'"8 must then be
distinguished as based upon the policy underlying a different regulatory
scheme, that of the Securities Act. 189 If the broader policy of the Securities
Act enunciated in Howey supports a more inclusive definition of a security,
then the Howey test established in furtherance of that policy should not be
used in a restrictive manner to support the narrower policy of the Securi-
185. Id §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
186. Id § 78b (1976).
187. Id.
188. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), Justice Murphy stated:
It [a broad definition of a security] permits the fulfillment of the statutory
purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of "the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordi-
nary concept of a security." H. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11. It
embodies a flexible rather than static principle, one that is capable of adapta-
tion to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.
328 U.S. at 299.
189. This statement conflicts with the dictum found in Chief Justice Warren's opinion in
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), which states that the two Acts are "virtually
identical." Id at 335-36. Though the language is virtually identical, one must argue that
the policy to be served by the different regulatory schemes is different.
[Vol. 37
SALE OF A BUSINESS DOCTRINE
ties Exchange Act. If this concern can be overcome by the simultaneous
adoption of the Howey test and recognition of the policy underlying the
Securities Exchange Act in Forman, then one might conclude that rule
lOb-5 is intended to protect only those investors who buy or sell securities
that satisfy the Howey tripartite test. Under this approach, the sale of a
business doctrine should be used to define securities under the Securities
Exchange Act. Since all of the cases to date that have considered the doc-
trine involved alleged violations of rule lOb-5, perhaps Securities Act
problems should be distinguished. 190
Use of a statutory definition of a security to exempt the sale of a business
from a regulatory regime creates problems, however, even if the definition
is limited to the Securities Exchange Act. The first potential problem
arises in the interpretation of margin prohibitions. 19 The language of the
margin provision covers credit extended and maintained as to purchases of
securities. Since the sale of a business would not be considered a security,
no limit could be placed on credit extended for the purchase of a control-
ling interest in a public corporation. The Federal Reserve Board's author-
ity to prescribe rules governing margin transactions should not be curtailed
so peremptorily.
The second conceivable difficulty concerns section 13(d) protective de-
vices in potential take-over situations. 92 This section provides notice of
acquisitions of substantial interests in publicly traded corporations. The
purchase of a security must be reported to the SEC and to the issuer when
ownership reaches the level of more than five percent of that class of secur-
ities.' 93 If the purchase of a controlling block of stock is also the purchase
of a business, and is not the purchase of a security, then some of the trans-
actions that the section was intended to reach could be excluded from
coverage.
One can only speculate as to the impact of the sale of a business doctrine
on section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. 194 This section serves as
the jurisdictional base for the promulgation by the SEC of rules on going
private. 95 When a corporation goes private it purchases control and usu-
ally 100% of its own stock. Under the sale of a business doctrine, in such a
situation the corporation would not be purchasing a security, but the seller
would be selling one. Such a result seems irrational, but differing treat-
ment of buyer and seller would be necessary to avoid complete nullifica-
tion of the protective scheme. These transactions highlight the artificiality
of the distinctions called for by the sale of a business doctrine, which really
should be called the purchase of a business doctrine.
Unexpected problems may also be encountered in proxy solicitation.
190. See supra notes 170-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of Securities Act
problems.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976).
192. Id § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
193. Id
194. Id § 78m(e) (1976).
195. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-1 to -4 (1982).
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State laws requiring shareholder approval of mergers necessitate the use of
proxies.' 96 In all mergers the purchase and sale of a business is the essen-
tial goal of the transaction. The SEC's proxy rules, 197 promulgated under
the authority of section 14(a), 198 apply to the solicitation of "any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security . . . registered pursuant
to section 12 of this article."' 99 In a merger transaction the authorization
sought from the shareholders of the acquiring corporation covers the
purchase of assets or common stock of the target business. If such a
purchase would not be the purchase of a security, would the proxies be "in
respect of' a security?2°° The proxies would actually be in respect of the
purchase of a business from the holder of a security in the target corpora-
tion. The need for approval by shareholders of the target corporation fur-
ther complicates the problem. Would these proxies be in respect of a
security? Evidently the sale, but not the purchase, of a security would
occur in this situation.
The issues discussed above in connection with section 14(a) also arise in
the context of tender offers under sections 14(d) and 14(e). 20, The growth
of the tender offer as a popular means of acquiring a business, whether
used alone or as a prelude to a statutory merger, makes these issues ques-
tions of considerable importance. Sections 14(d) and 14(e) apply to "a
tender offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any class of any
equity security which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title. 20 2
The language of section 14(e) that makes unlawful misrepresentations and
omissions not only in tender offers but also "in connection with any tender
offer . . . in opposition to or in favor of any such offer" further compli-
cates the matter.203 Although the case law has not yet established exactly
which parties possess an implied cause of action for violations of this sec-
tion,2°4 tender offerees and perhaps successful tender offerors could proba-
bly bring such a suit if the tender offer involved a security. Since the goal
of the offer is the purchase of a business, however, perhaps the offers do
not involve a security.
Some of the horrors described above are admittedly based upon the po-
tential expansion of the sale of a business doctrine beyond any of the liti-
gated cases. These expansions are arguably consistent with both the
language and rationales of those cases, however. If the Supreme Court
cases concerning the definition of a security do not mandate either adop-
196. Private parties have found the proxy rules a fertile field for litigation. See the semi-
nal private litigation case of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
198. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -103 (1982).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (emphasis added).
200. Id
201. Id § 78n(d)-(e).
202. Id. § 78n(d)(1) (emphasis added).
203. Id. § 78n(e).
2Q4. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 47 (1977) (rejecting implied private
cause of action allowing tender offeror to sue for damages under § 14(e) of Securities Ex-
change Act).
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tion or rejection of the doctrine, then the effects of the doctrine on various
provisions of the Acts must be considered. Whether these effects militate
against adoption of the doctrine or merely indicate the need for substantial
limitation of it is an open question.
IV. CONCLUSION
The sale of a business doctrine is an engaging concept. Even strong be-
lievers in investor protection must wonder at the growth of the federal se-
curities laws from an acorn to a judicial oak in less than fifty years. Use of
the sale of a business doctrine as a pruning tool, however, might substitite
a chainsaw for a branch clipper. In Sutter v. Groen,205 the most recent
Seventh Circuit decision on this issue, the court of appeals recognized the
need for clarification of the doctrine. 2°6 Judge Posner's opinion for the
court suggests that the important distinction between entrepreneurs and
investors has been lost.20 7 Theoretically these two categories of persons
have distinct economic functions. The investor places his capital at risk in
exchange for a return appropriate to the risk encountered. The entrepre-
neur, in contrast, combines the investment of capital with innovation and
management of the enterprise in which the capital is invested. In a very
general sense, disclosure of information is most critical to efficient invest-
ment decisions. Interference in the capital market can thus be justified
only by the need for investors to gather adequate risk information. The
entrepreneur, on the other hand, who may also be investing capital in the
enterprise, is motivated primarily by the anticipated return on his innova-
tive management techniques and only secondarily by the anticipated re-
turn on his capital. Market interference for the purpose of providing risk
information to such a person would not be an efficient utilization of
resources.
Judge Posner's analysis indicates that since the Securities Acts were
designed primarily to provide risk information to investors, securities
should be defined in a manner consistent with protecting only investor in-
terests. The sale of a business doctrine provides a rough method of identi-
fying those situations in which the interest involved is entrepreneurial and
risk information disclosure is unwarranted. While Sutter provides a valu-
able approach to limiting the market interference of the Securities Acts,
the distinctions drawn in that case may be difficult to apply to complex
financial transactions. In the close corporation setting former owners may
be retained in management positions either as part of the compensation
paid by a true entrepreneur, as a disguised anticompetitive move by either
205. 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
206. Sutter was the 70% owner of a corporation that had agreed to purchase 100% of the
stock in the corporation in which the Groens were the sole shareholders. Alleging misrepre-
sentations by the Groens in order to induce the sale, Sutter brought suit based on a violation
of rule lOb-5. The court, relying on a rebuttable presumption of entrepreneurship because
Sutter owned over 50% of a corporation purchasing 100% of another, held there was no
purchase of a security and no lOb-5 violation. Id at 203.
207. Id at 201.
19831
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
an entrepreneur or an investor, or as an indication of the pure investor
status of the purchaser. In the smaller public corporation the purchase of
control may reflect either an entrepreneurial decision based on a recogni-
tion that present management has lost its entrepreneurial drive, or an in-
vestment with a reserve of entrepreneurial rights exercisable when needed,
or an investment with an incidental right of control. In the large public
corporation acquisition of control may result from motives ranging from
entrepreneurial ambition to conglomerate investment diversification. 208
This analysis indicates that significant justifications support the sale of a
business doctrine. The cases involving the doctrine do not indicate so
clearly, however, that a threshold exemption from all of the protective de-
vices of the Securities Acts is warranted. The classical assumption that
entrepreneurs need less risk information than investors may be true in a
simpler economic system, but our complex economic world includes arbi-
trageurs, investment banks, and active representatives of large numbers of
passive investors, as well as entrepreneurs and investors. Use of the defini-
tion of a security to distinguish these groups may be extremely difficult for
the trial courts. In our primitive society allegory, tampering with the defi-
nition of a brick after the brick was inserted into a wall told us nothing
about the chinks in the wall, the cracks in the brick, or the composition of
the mortar. The society desired to attain an adequate supply of effective
shelters. Defining the brick as no longer a brick, however, was not the
ideal means of achieving that goal.
208. The Suter court suggested a procedural approach to these difficult applications. Id
at 202-03. In cases involving the sale of a business, a presumption would arise that a secur-
ity was not involved. A purchaser would have the opportunity to rebut the presumption and
demonstrate his true investor status. Id at 203.
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